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Introduction 
Heinrich Heine, reflecting on his acquaintance with Hegel in Berlin, writes this: ‘I often used 
to see him looking around anxiously as if in fear he might be understood. He was very fond 
of me, for he was sure I would never betray him. As a matter of fact, I then thought that he 
was very obsequious. Once when I grew impatient with him for saying: “All that is, is 
rational,” he smiled strangely and remarked, “It may also be said that all that is rational must 
be.” Then he looked about him hastily; but he was speedily reassured, for only Heinrich Beer 
had heard his words. It was not till later that I understood these expressions. Not till later did I 
understand what he meant when he declared in his Philosophy of History that Christianity 
represents progress because it teaches the doctrine of a God who died; while heathen gods 
knew nothing of death. What a step forward it would be, if we could declare that God never 
existed at all!’2  
Heinrich Heine is not always a reliable witness and one wonders whether it really was 
Hegel’s intention not to be understood. But the comments that concern the inextricable bond 
between ‘thought’ and ‘being’, and Christianity’s doctrine of ‘a God who died’ take us to the 
heart of his philosophy and sum up rather well why Hegel could appeal to the composer 
Richard Wagner. So first, Hegel’s view that ‘thought’ is not just about ‘being’ but concerns 
‘the self-determining and self-unfolding of being itself’3 coheres rather nicely with Wagner’s 
understanding of music as ‘idea’, which is so closely related to his understanding of 
teleology. Secondly, the ‘death of God’ is a key to Wagner’s Lutheran outlook which he so 
closely shared with Hegel. And so in this article I am going to take a new look at Wagner’s 
appropriation of Hegel in relation to four themes which are central for the Ring cycle: ‘idea’, 
teleology, providence, and the ‘death of God’.  
                                                          
1 This is a revision of a seminar paper given to the Department of Theology and Religious Studies at the 
University of Nottingham on 19 October 2016. I have enjoyed helpful conversations and e-mail exchange with 
Ryan Häcker who also gave me written comments on the paper. Stephen Houlgate, Professor of Philosophy at 
the University of Warwick, kindly read through the paper and sent me detailed comments on key aspects of the 
paper. Any shortcoming of this article are, of course, the sole responsibility of the author.  
2 Heinrich Heine, ‘Self Portrait, “Am I a Destroyer of Faith?”’, in Self Portrait and Other Writings, ed. and tr. 
Frederic Ewen (Secaucus, NJ, 1948), 254-55. 
3 Stephen Houlgate, Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and History, 2nd edn (Oxford, 2005), 45. 
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Wagner’s knowledge of Hegel 
Hegel was born in 1770 and died in 1831 when Wagner was 18 years old, and it was in this 
year that Wagner enrolled at the University of Leipzig. Hegel was the thinker everyone was 
talking about and, even if Wagner had never read a word of the most influential philosopher 
of that time, he would have imbibed much of Hegel’s world view. In discussing Wagner’s 
philosophical development reference is often made to the influence of his uncle, Adolf 
Wagner (1774-1835). His uncle had studied at the Leipzig Thomana and then in 1792 
registered in the theology faculty of the University, although his interests focussed on classics 
(C.D. Beck was teaching there) and philosophy, especially German philosophy. In 1798 he 
went to Jena, for a year of study where he attended Fichte’s lectures but we do not know 
whether he attended Schelling’s (in Jena 1798-1803).4 Although he left before Hegel’s arrival 
in Jena in January 1801 one can say that he was nevertheless ‘influenced above all by 
Hegel’.5 No doubt his enthusiasm for the philosopher spilled over to his nephew. Wagner 
may also have received Hegelian ideas from his uncle’s friend, Christian Hermann Weisse 
(1801-66). Wagner tells us in his autobiography that ‘Two or three times . . . I attended 
lectures on aesthetics given by one of the younger professors, a man named Weiss’.6 This 
much neglected philosopher/theologian had studied under Hegel and in 1829 two books 
appeared, one concerning the current state of philosophy in relation to Hegel’s system and the 
other a translation of Aristotle ‘on the soul’ (de anima) and ‘on the world’ (de mundo, 
wrongly attributed to Aristotle).7 Then in 1830 his System of Aesthetics appeared which, 
although holding to a Hegelian method, did not entirely hold to the Hegelian teaching.8 
Wagner was justly enthralled with Weisse when he met him at his uncle’s home and, no 
                                                          
4 Carl Fr. Glasenapp, Das Leben Richard Wagners, 6 vols., 4th edn (Leipzig, 1905), i.21.  
5 Joachim Köhler, Richard Wager: The Last of the Titans, tr. Stewart Spencer (New Haven/London, 2004), 10, 
638 n. 10. He rightly points to his ‘Hegelian German’; note, however, that the example he gives is taken from a 
point in Glasenapp, Leben, i.490, where he is offering a free rendition. The original can be found in Adolf 
Wagner, Zwei Epochen der modernen Posie (Leipzig, 1806), 15. 
6 Richard Wagner, My Life, tr. Andrew Gray ed. Mary Whittall (Cambridge, 1983) [ML], 54. One should not 
draw too many conclusions from the fact that the name is given incorrectly since shortly after this ‘Weinlig’ is 
referred to as ‘Weinlich’. 
7 Wagner appears to conflate these two works when he writes that Weisse ‘had just translated Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics and had dedicated it, with a polemical intent, to Hegel, if I remember correctly’ (ML, 54). 
8 See Rudolf Seydel’s comments in the foreword to the 1872 edition of System der Ästhetik, ed. Rudolf Seydel 
(Leipzig, 1872), IV. Seydel also writes that Weisse did in fact lecture on aesthetics in the Winter Semester of 
1831-32, hence corroborating Wagner’s account.  
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doubt, this encouraged him later to study Hegel: ‘I had listened to a conversation between 
these two men about philosophy and philosophers, which impressed me very deeply’.9  
As far as we know it was about fifteen years later that Wagner started to read Hegel. 
First, he read the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), sometime in the period 1846-47. Although 
he may well have had difficulty understanding this highly demanding work,10 something even 
seasoned Hegelians experience,11 I think the work did make a deep impression upon him. 
Around the same time read a much more accessible work, Lectures on the Philosophy of 
History. This was based on Hegel’s notes and those of his students of the lectures he gave 
five times in Berlin, starting in 1822-23, and delivered every two years until 1830-31. 
Wagner used the second edition of 184012 and this was the only work of modern philosophy 
in Wagner’s personal library in Dresden and he dates the first reading to 1847. In addition to 
these two works he may have read the Aesthetics and if he did not he must have learned about 
Hegel’s ideas through some other means13 since his Zürich essays so clearly reflect Hegel’s 
Aesthetics14 not to mention the close correspondence between the two thinkers on Greek 
literature.15 
One factor which drew Wagner to Hegel’s philosophy was its relation to history. His 
Annals for 1847 tell of his interest in ‘Greek Antiquity’ and for the history he mentions 
                                                          
9 ML, 54.  
10 See Friedrich Pecht, Aus meiner Zeit, 2 vols. (Munich, 1894), 1:294): ‘One day when I called on him I found 
him burning with passion for Hegel’s Phenomenology, which he was just studying, and which, he told me with 
typical extravagance, was the best book ever printed. To prove it he read me a passage which had particularly 
impressed him. Since I did not entirely follow it, I asked him to read it again, upon which neither of us could 
understand it. He read it a third time and a fourth, until in the end we both looked at one another and burst out 
laughing. And that was the end of phenomenology’. This is found in the chapter 10 ‘Dresden 1846-47’ (279-
303) hence dating Wagner’s reading of the Phenomenology in 1846-47. 
11 E.g. J.N. Finlay, in A.V. Miller (ed.), Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford, 1977), xxix, writes that ‘[t]he 
packed thought of §§803-4 . . . defies reproduction in terms other than its own, and one is quite unsure that one 
has got the full gist of it’.  
12 Eduard Gans edited the first edition of 1837 and this was updated by Karl Hegel (Hegel’s son) for the second 
edition of 1840. This edition provides the basis for that of Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Marcus Michel (G.W.F. 
Hegel: Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte (Frankfurt am Main, 1970) [Geschichte] which 
corresponds to the English translation of J. Sibree, Lectures on the Philosophy of History (London, 1861) 
[History].  
13 The celebrated music theorist and critic A.B. Marx, editor of the Berlin Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung, 
whom Wagner knew, was a Hegelian (The Diary of Richard Wagner 1865-82: The Brown Book, ed. Joachim 
Bergfeld, tr. George Bird (London, 1980), 94, records his having dinner with him), and Schumann’s influential 
Neue Zeitschrift für Musik ‘devoted the greater part of ten successive issues’ (22 July to 23 August, 1842, the 
journal appeared twice weekly) to a critique by Eduard Krüger of Hegel’s idea on aesthetics’ (Pete le Huray and 
James Day, Music and Aesthetics in Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries (Cambridge, 1981), 340, 530). 
14 See Bojan Bujić, Music in European thought 1851-1912 (Cambridge, 1988), 51-52. 
15 See Daniel H. Foster, Wagner’s Ring Cycle and the Greeks (Cambridge, 2010), passim.  
4 
 
Gibbon, ‘classical historical works’, Droysen’s Alexander and Hellenism, and then adds ‘also 
Hegel’s Philosophy of History’, suggesting a rather cursory reading.16 His autobiography 
explains a little further the link between history and philosophy. He tells us: ‘I had always felt 
an inclination to try to fathom the depths of philosophy’. After some rather bad starts he then 
writes of a much more detailed reading in the winter of 1848-49. ‘During the last period of 
my residence in Dresden I had nonetheless tried to do justice to this old, now newly 
awakened urge, and took as a point of departure the more searching historical studies which 
so greatly satisfied me at the time. For my introduction to the philosophy of Hegel I chose his 
Philosophy of History. Much of this impressed me, and it appeared as if I would gain 
admittance to the inner sanctum by this route. The more incomprehensible I found many of 
the most sweeping and speculative sentences of this tremendously famous intellect, who had 
been commended to me as the keystone of philosophic understanding, the more I felt 
impelled to get to the bottom of what was termed “the absolute” and everything connected 
with it. The revolution interrupted this effort’.17   
 
‘Idea’ 
The striking thing about his praise of Hegel I have just quoted, is that these words were 
dictated to his second wife Cosima at a time when he had come under the spell of Hegel’s 
most vociferous opponent Arthur Schopenhauer. You will find Wagner’s criticism of Hegel 
after his discovery of Schopenhauer in 1854 but often this is just parroting Schopenhauer 
himself. That Wagner remained under Hegel’s spell is claimed by Nietzsche in The Case of 
Wagner: ‘Let us remember that Wagner was young at the time when Hegel and Schelling 
were seducing people’s minds; that he achieved, that he grasped in his hands, something only 
Germans took seriously – “the Idea”, by which he meant something dark, uncertain, and full 
of vague presentiments; with Germans, clarity is an objection, logic is a refutation. . . . Let us 
keep morality out of this: Hegel is a taste  . . . And not just a German taste but a European 
one! – a taste that Wagner understood! – that he felt equal to! that he immortalized! – He just 
applied it to music – he invented a style that “meant the infinite”, – he became Hegel’s heir  . 
. . Music as “Idea” – –’18 This last comment corresponds exactly to Cosima’s entry for 3 
                                                          
16 Brown Book, 94. 
17 ML, 429-30. Note also that around this time that he had become associated with Mikael Bakunin (ML, 384-
89) for whom Hegel was central. 
18 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings, ed. 
Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman (Cambridge, 2012), 252. 
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April 1870 (she is quoting her husband): ‘[Music] is not the representation of an idea (die 
Darstellung einer Idee), but the idea itself’.19  
So what is this ‘idea’ for Wagner and, going back to his autobiography, what was it 
that Wagner discovered about ‘the absolute’ in Philosophy of History? The ‘absolute’ of 
course is the world Spirit (Geist), the subject of world history. If the drama of the Ring can be 
seen in terms of the evolution of Spirit,20 what then is the ‘idea’ when Wagner says ‘Music is 
not the representation of an idea, but the idea itself’? For Hegel the idea was the reason in 
being, nature and history. It is the rationality immanent in the world itself,21 and the world is 
a manifestation of the idea. So if Wagner considered music as the idea perhaps the ironic 
description he gave of his dramas as ‘deeds of music made visible’ (‘ersichtlich gewordene 
Thaten des Musik’) is not so far off the mark.22 A further aspect of the idea is that it is 
essentially teleological, i.e. it is working towards a certain goal (telos). So Houlgate writes ‘in 
nature the idea is the logic that is immanent in and generated by space as such and that leads 
to the emergence of freely moving matter and eventually to life’.23 Hegel is therefore 
understanding his ‘idea’ not in terms of Plato’s forms but more with Aristotle’s formal-final 
cause. Therefore with this teleological sense it means that if everything is the appearance of 
an idea, ‘it strives to realize the absolute idea’.24 So for Wagner one could say the music 
provides the rationality for the development of the Spirit.25  
This is particularly striking because Wagner’s system of musical ‘leitmotifs’ could be 
said to have a fundamentally ‘teleological’ function above and beyond that of what could be 
music’s general teleological function. The discussion could become somewhat muddied since 
                                                          
19 Cosima Wagner’s Diaries, 2 vols., ed. Martin Gregor-Dellin and Dietrich Mack, tr. Geoffrey Skelton 
(London/New York, 1978-80) [CD], i.205-6. Note that later that year Wagner wrote his Beethoven essay, very 
much influenced by Schopenhauer. However, the comment Cosima records is clearly Hegelian, not 
Schopenhauerian (for whom music was the objectification of the ‘will’, not the ‘ideas’). 
20 Cf. Wolfgang Perschmann, Die optimistische Tragödie (Graz, 1986), vii, who calls Das Rheingold ‘Die 
Historie des expansiven Geistes’. 
21 Houlgate, Hegel, 25. 
22 The Name Musikdrama (Gesammelte Schriften und Dichtungen von Richard Wagner, 10 vols., 3rd edn 
(Leipzig, 1897) [GSD], ix.306; cf. Richard Wagner’s Prose Works, tr. and ed. William Ashton Ellis, 8 vols. 
(London, 1892-9) [PW], v.303). 
23 Houlgate, Hegel, 25. 
24 Frederick Beiser, Hegel (New York/London, 2005), 67. 
25 See Wagner’s Beethoven essay where music has an a priori function and where he writes of ‘this conscious 
representation of the idea of the world (Darstellung der Idee der Welt) in drama’ being ‘preformed by those 
inner laws of music’ (Roger Allen, Richard Wagner’s Beethoven (Woodbridge, 2014), 144-45; cf. PW v.106-7; 
GSD ix.106). Beethoven was written between 20 July and 7 September 1870 (Allen, Beethoven, 2), notes being 
made 3 to 20 July (ibid, 12), just 3 months after the entry from Cosima’s diary quoted above.   
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Wagner did not use the term ‘leitmotif’ but instead used a variety of other terms; but many of 
these point to a teleological function. First, one can point to ‘Motive,’ ‘musikalische 
Motiven’, ‘plastische Natur-Motiven’ and ‘thematische Motiven’. As Grey argues, the 
English ‘motive’ and ‘motif’ are both included in the German ‘Motif’ so the terms just 
mentioned have a certain ambiguity and may include ‘motive’ which is clearly teleological.26 
Secondly, the expression ‘melodische Momente’27 is not referring to an instant in time (hence 
I think the translation ‘melodic moments’ can mislead) but rather with a movement through 
time and could be translated as ‘melodic impulses’ and could likewise be understood as 
teleological. But whatever terms are used, it is clear that these melodic elements are 
employed for anticipation and recollection and, more fundamentally for our enquiry, mutate 
into other motifs.28  
 
Teleology 
The sense of teleology (the goal (telos) to which something is working) can be discerned 
right from the beginning of the Ring, in the prelude to Rheingold, and I take this as my 
example. The composer builds up the diatonic scale of Eb major by introducing the notes of 
the harmonic series: first the octave (Eb – Eb) from bar 1, then the fifth (Bb) from bar 5, and 
then the third (G) in bars 18 and 20. He then fills in the other notes of the scale from bar 49. 
Such a harmonic series is deeply rooted in mathematics and in ‘nature’. But with the entry of 
the first singer, Woglinde, we hear a pentatonic melody which continues for 13 bars, only to 
be broken by Woglinde’s ‘Safe from your reach’ (‘Sicher von dir’). We therefore move from 
a harmonic structure to a melodic one, in particular a melodic structure associated with a 
                                                          
26 Thomas Grey, Wagner’s Musical Prose (Cambridge, 1995), 319-21. 
27 This expression ‘melodische Momente’ is used seven times in the collected writings (GSD iv.114, PW ii.251; 
GSD iv.200-2; PW ii.346-48). Since only the plural occurs there is an ambiguity as to whether Wagner is 
referring to ‘der Moment’ (an instant in time) or ‘das Moment’ (an aspect, factor, impulse). However, his use of 
‘Moment’ in the singular makes it clear we are concerned with the latter (I counted 56 instances in the works 
available in Richard Wagner: Werke, Schriften und Briefe, ed. Sven Friedrich (Berlin, 2004)). See, e.g., iii.311: 
‘Der Mensch, den die Musik herstellen wollte, war in Wirklichkeit aber nichts Anderes, als die Melodie, d.h. das 
Moment bestimmtester, überzeugendster Lebensäußerung des wirklich lebendigen, inneren Organismus der 
Musik.’ Ellis translates it thus; ‘But the man whom Music wished to erect, was really none other than Melody, 
i.e. the moment of most definite, most convincing utterance of her actual living, inner organism’ (PW ii.106). It 
would be better to translate ‘Moment’ here as ‘impulse’. 
28 See Epilogue to the ‘Nibelung’s Ring’ (GSD vi.266; PW iii.266): ‘With the “Rheingold” I was starting on the 
new path, where I had first to find the plastic nature-motives which, in ever more individual evolution, were to 
shape themselves into exponents of the various forms of Passion in the many–membered Action and its 
characters’. 
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‘primordial form of music’.29 As Nattiez argues this transition reflects Wagner’s comments in 
Opera and Drama: ‘But that Melody to whose birth we now are listening, forms a complete 
antithesis (ein vollkommener Gegensatz) to the primal Mother-melody’.30 Further, Wagner 
writes of the musician mounting ‘from the depths to the surface of the sea of Harmony; and 
from that surface will be celebrated the glorious marriage of Poetry’s begetting Thought with 
Music’s endless power of Birth’.31 I think it not purely coincidental that he immediately goes 
on to write: ‘That ‘wave-borne’ (‘wogende’!) mirror-image is Melody’.32  
If Wagner’s reflections in Opera and Drama can be related to Rheingold, it is striking 
that the ‘complete antithesis’ of Woglinde’s entry contains within it the notes of the diatonic 
scale which have been presented in the Prelude. It is as though with the entry of the 
Rheinmaidens we have the emergence of ‘culture’ out of ‘nature’ and the ‘birth of 
consciousness’.33 We have what could be seen as an expression of Hegel’s dialectic, in a 
musical and dramatic temporal sequence.34 So musically we have seen how the pentatonic 
melody of Woglinde, although an ‘antithesis’ to the harmonic prelude, is already contained 
within that prelude. Further, we also find an antithesis in the way the drama develops. The 
Rheinmaidens, of all the characters in the Ring (including Erda!), are the ones most at one 
with nature. Nature is manifest in the waves of the Rhine and the waves in turn are manifest 
in the Rhinemaidens suggested among other things by their very names Woglinde and 
Wellgunde.35 But when they appear on stage they see themselves as distinct from nature even 
though they come out of nature (as expressed in the emergence of their pentatonic melody). 
Also in the ensuing drama of the first scene we have again a temporal expression of the 
                                                          
29 Jean-Jacques Nattiez, Wagner Androgyne: A Study in Interpretation, tr. Stewart Spencer (Princeton, 1993), 
57.  
30 Ibid., 58; PW ii.284 (modified); GSD iv.145. 
31 PW ii.280; GSD iv.142. 
32 PW ii.280; GSD iv.142. 
33 Cf Zukunftsmusik: ‘If we may broadly denote the whole range of Nature as an evolutionary march from 
unconsciousness to consciousness, and if this march is shewn the most conspicuously in the human individual, 
we may take its observation in the life of the Artist as one of the most interesting, because in him and his 
creations the World itself displays itself and comes to consciousness’ (PW 3:296; GSD vii.88). Note, however, 
that this work was not written until September 1860.  
34 Hegel’s dialectic is rooted in his ‘logic’, one of the most difficulty areas of his philosophy, and in fact is not 
fundamentally temporal.  
35 ‘Woglinde’ is derived from ‘wogen’ (‘to heave’ or ‘to billow’) and MHG ‘linde’ (‘gentle’). ‘Wellgunde’ is 
derived from ‘Welle’ (‘wave’) and possibly from ON gunnr (‘battle’). Note that the third Rhinemaiden, 
Flosshilde, has a name not derived from the waves but from the ‘fin’ (Flosse’) and ‘hilt’ (‘battle’). Note that she 
is the one who has the sense of responsibility in warning her sisters to guard the gold. 
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Hegelian. Wagner expresses an innocence in the melody and the words of the Rhinemaidens. 
In Woglinde’s first entry we not only have the pentatonic melody but words which are ‘soft’: 
‘Weia! Waga! / Woge, du Welle (Heave, you wave)! / Walle zur Wiege (wave around the 
cradle)! / Wagalaweia! / Wallala weiala weia!’ Not only are half of these words 
untranslatable but vowels predominate; they have a natural softness and the same goes for the 
consonants all of which bar one (z) Wagner considered to be soft: so we have here G, L (a 
‘liquid’! consonant), D, W (as opposed to what Wagner considered “energetic consonants” K, 
R, P, T or strengthened one such as Schr, Sp, St, Pr).36 Wagner likened ‘the movement of the 
waves’ in Rheingold as ‘the world’s lullaby’,37 and in an open letter to Nietzsche (12 June 
1872) he explained how he had ‘and thus built up a root-syllabic melody for my 
watermaidens, after the analogy of the “Eia popeia” [“hushabye”] of our nursery-songs’.38 
The words and melody of the Rhinemaidens certainly suggest a rocking movement. But 
implicit in all this is a certain seductiveness39 which is manifest when they meet Alberich. 
But what Hegel calls ‘Entzweiung’ (‘bifurcation’, ‘diremtion’) and consequent ‘fall’ comes 
about not simply because of a ‘third party’ (Alberich/serpent of Genesis 3) but, as Hegel 
emphasized, because of something rooted in the individual.40 So the ‘fall’ Wagner presents 
corresponds to Hegel’s view that the ‘Entzweiung’ is immanent in the human being and not 
imposed from outside.41 After this ‘diremtion’ there is the ‘sublation’ (‘Aufhebung’) whereby 
a position of greater maturity is reached and culminates at the end of the Ring cycle when 
they gives Brünnhilde ‘sincere counsel’. This is how Wagner in Artwork of the Future 
presents the spontaneous emergence of human life from nature, the birth of consciousness 
and the fall into error, all of which occur in Rheingold Scene 1. ‘The moment we humans 
became aware of our difference from nature, the very moment we began to develop as human 
beings and to break away from our unconscious, animal existence as children of nature to 
                                                          
36 PW ii.271; GSD iv.134. For an example of the strengthened consonants see Alberich’s third entry: ‘Stör’ ich 
eu’r Spiel, wenn staunend ich still hier steh’’. 
37 CD i.127 (entry for 17 July 1869). 
38 PW 5:297. ‘eia pop eia’ in Greek means ‘now then, ha, now then’. The German song begins: ‘Eia, popeia, 
was raschelt im Stroh?’ 
39 In Scene 2 Fricka considers the ‘watery brood’ as dangerously seductive (Wagner’s Ring of the Nibelung: A 
Companion, ed. Stewart Spencer and Barry Millington (London, 1993), 83). 
40 One way to consider this is the role of the Rhinemaidens’ breasts. To a child the mother’s breast is a source of 
comfort and nourishment, but for an adult male the effect can be rather different as can be seen in Alberich’s 
wish to nestle up to Wellgunde’s ‘heaving breast’ (‘schwellende Brust’; cf. ‘wogen’, ‘to heave’). Hence the 
‘negative’ of being ‘sexually seductive’ emerges out of the ‘positive’ of ‘comforting’ and the ‘nourishing’.  
41 Michael Inwood, Hegel, (New York/London, 1983), 95. 
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wake to conscious life – when we set ourselves apart from nature and, from that first 
sensation of dependence on nature, thought began to develop within us – this was the moment 
we went astray, error as the first expression of consciousness. Yet out of error knowledge is 
born and the history of the birth of knowledge out of error is the history of the human species 
from primitive myth to the present day’.42 
We see then in Rheingold an ‘evolution’ not only in the realm of nature43 but also of 
culture. The striking thing about Wagner’s own creation myth is that, in contrast to those in 
his Norse sources, it is ‘teleological’; but this is not an external teleology but an internal one, 
i.e. the purpose is immanent, no external intervention or manipulation being involved. 44 
Wagner thus presents an organic view of the world, and so stands not only with Hegel but 
also with Herder, Schelling, and Schiller who reacted against the mechanistic views of the 
world found in seventeenth century science. Such mechanistic views, originating with 
Descartes, saw the world in terms of matter, inertness, impact, efficient causality and 
atomism. But at the close of the eighteenth century there was a move to more organic views, 
and this was partly propelled by a rather different scientific worldview associated with 
attraction, magnetism and electricity, chemistry, epigenesis (i.e. organisms grow and develop 
by their own power and are not preformed) and human sciences.45 The father of this 
alternative was Leibniz (who revived Aristotelian ideas of an organic universe). Hegel’s view 
of the organic world, although interwoven with the developments of what was called 
‘Naturphilosophie’, was originally inspired by classical and platonic ideas. In the Tübinger 
Stift Hegel, together with Schelling and Hölderlin, were enthusiastic about Plato, especially 
the Timaeus.46 But even more important for his teleology was theology as can be seen in his 
use of John 1:1-4 in the Spirit of Christianity.47 Therefore the relation of the Father to the Son 
                                                          
42 Emma Warner, ‘The Artwork of the Future’, The Wagner Journal, Special Issue (2013), 13. Cf PW i.83. 
43 Note, however, that Hegel himself rejected an idea of evolution in the natural world and this was rooted in 
that fact that he was interested in ‘the logical and not the temporal relations between phenomena in nature’ 
(Houlgate, Hegel, 173). However, one could argue that in principle his philosophy of nature does not necessarily 
entail a rejection of evolution including Darwin (ibid, 174).      
44 Cf. Inwood, Hegel, 246-47.  
45 Beiser, Hegel, 84-85. 
46 Beiser, Hegel, 87, points to Timaeus 30D: ‘God constructed it as a Living Creature, one and visible’ (LCL 54-
55) and 33B (Plato speaks of ‘that Living Creature which is designed to embrace within itself all living 
creatures’ (LCL 60-61). Note that Wagner had the works of Plato in his Dresden library in Schleiermacher’s 
translation but Timaeus (and Laws) were not included in this edition. 
47 G.W.F. Hegel, On Christianity: Early Theological Writings, tr. T.M. Knox (Gloucester MA, 1970), 256, 
argues that ‘the predicates [of the Logos] are not concepts, not universals’ but rather ‘something being and 
living’. Further, ‘in him [the Logos] was life’ (John 1.4). 
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‘is not a conceptual unity’ but rather ‘a living relation of living beings’.48 What may be 
contradictory in the realm of the dead is not in the realm of life. ‘A tree which has three 
branches makes up with them one tree; but every ‘son’ of the tree, every branch . . . is itself a 
tree’.49 Such an organic view not only helps explain the trinity but also, if applied to nature, 
overcomes the alienation between the individual and nature.50  
What then was Wagner’s own distinctive contribution to teleology in his 
appropriation of Hegel? His genius does not lie in his cumbersome prose, even though I think 
he does have some remarkable insights. Rather his genius lies in his music and his drama. 
Nietzsche expresses it so in the fourth of his Untimely Meditations, Richard Wagner in 
Bayreuth, 236-37: ‘The poetic element in Wagner is disclosed by the fact that he thinks in 
visible and palpable events, not in concepts; that is to say, he thinks mythically, as the folk 
has always thought.  The myth is not founded on a thought, as the children of an artificial 
culture believe, it is itself a mode of thinking; it communicates an idea of the world, but as a 
succession of events, actions and sufferings. Der Ring des Nibelungen is a tremendous 
system of thought without the conceptual form of thought. Perhaps a philosopher could set 
beside it something exactly corresponding to it but lacking all image or action and speaking 
to us merely in concepts: one would then have presented the same thing in two disparate 
spheres, once for the folk and once for the antithesis of the folk, the theoretical man. Thus 
Wagner does not address himself to the latter; for the theoretical man understands of the 
poetical, of the myth, precisely as much as a deaf man does of music, that is to say both 
behold a movement which seems to them meaningless’.51 Therefore in respect to Hegel, 
Wagner expresses the Hegelian dialectic by means of the musical and dramatic temporal 
sequence. 
 
Providence 
Hegel argues in Philosophy of History that ‘Reason directs the World’ which is in the form 
‘of the religious truth, that the world is not abandoned to chance and external contingent 
causes, but that a Providence (Vorsehung) controls it’.52 But such providence is not the 
                                                          
48 Hegel, On Christianity, 260.  
49 Hegel, On Christianity, 261.  
50 Beiser, Hegel, 88. 
51 Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, ed. Daniel Breazeale, tr. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge, 2001 repr.), 
236-37. 
52 Hegel, History, 13; Geschichte, 25. 
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simple optimism his opponents have credited him with.53 Indeed Hegel goes on to speak of 
history as a ‘slaughter bench’ (Schlachtbank).54 But despite this Hegel nevertheless views 
history as a theodicy, a view he expressed in the final paragraph of Philosophy of History: 
‘That the History of the World, with all the changing scenes which its annals present, is this 
process of development and the realization of Spirit, - this is the true Theodicæa, the 
justification of God in History. Only this insight can reconcile Spirit with the History of the 
World – viz., that what has happened, and is happening every day, is not only not “without 
God,” but is essentially His Work’.55 Fundamental to this theodicy is that somehow the death 
of Christ is written into the very fabric of history, a point to which I will return. 
Just as Philosophy of History deals with theodicy, so does the Ring. The world is 
recreated at the end of the drama and one of the purposes of the whole drama is that a woman 
(Brünnhilde) becomes wise, fully self-conscious and hence free. This was only possible 
through her betrayal and the death of Siegfried: ‘it was I whom the purest man / had to 
betray, / that a woman might grow wise’.56 Freedom is the goal to which Hegel’s Spirit is 
directed and bearing in mind the teleological sense of ‘idea’ one can sum up a fair amount of 
Hegel’s thought with the words ‘the idea of spirit is freedom’.57 So Brünnhilde is free in that 
what she wants to do is exactly the right thing to do, i.e. sacrifice herself.58 Desire and reason 
now finally coincide. We see this idea in these words from the final scene: ‘Alles, alles, / 
Alles weiß ich: / alles ward mir nun frei!’ ‘All things, all things, all things I know: all things 
became free to me’.59 The ideas behind ‘alles ward mir nun frei’ I suggest are all things 
became free in relation to me such that I could find my own freedom in them or I am free 
from any misconceptions, misunderstandings or any other hindrances.  
                                                          
53 Houlgate, Hegel, 18: Hegel is not ‘the naïve Enlightenment optimist caricatured by Nietzsche or 
Schopenhauer’.  
54 Hegel, History, 22; Geschichte, 35. But note that ‘[i]t is not the general idea that is implicated in opposition 
and combat, and that is exposed to danger. It remains in the background, untouched and uninjured. This may be 
called the cunning of reason (List der Vernunft) – that it sets the passion to work for itself, while that which 
develops its existence through such impulsion pays the penalty, and suffers loss’ (History, 34; Geschichte, 49). 
55 Hegel, History, 477. Hegel, Geschichte, 540. 
56 Ring Companion, 349. 
57 G.A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence (Oxford, 2000), 12. 
58 Her willingness to sacrifice herself contrasts rather starkly with the synoptic gospels but has a parallel in 
Wagner’s Jesus of Nazareth sketches.  
59 All the English translations I have consulted translate the final phrase ‘all is clear to me now!’ (Ring 
Companion, 349). However, if one wanted to express this in German one would not say ‘alles ward mir nun 
frei’. 
12 
 
Wagner’s letter to August Röckel of 25/26 January 1854, in prison in Waldheim, 
includes addressing an issue which was understandably close to Röckel’s heart: freedom. 
What he writes could equally be a commentary on Brünnhilde’s state of mind in that final 
scene of Götterdämmerung: ‘One thing counts above all else: freedom! But what is 
‘freedom’? is it – as our politicians believe – “licence?” – of course not! Freedom is: 
integrity. He who is true to himself, i.e. who acts in accord with his own being, and in perfect 
harmony with his own nature, is free’.60  
  
Death of God 
Going back to that quotation from Heine, he said according to Hegel ‘Christianity represents 
progress because it teaches the doctrine of a God who died; while heathen gods knew nothing 
of death’. If by ‘heathen gods’ Hegel meant the Greek gods, then what he says is perfectly 
true. Greek gods may lose their power or influence but they do not undergo death as such.61 
But other mythologies do have the death of gods, and one reason Norse mythology may have 
appealed to Wagner is that the chief god Odin does die (he is swallowed by the Wolf 
Fenris).62 As Wagner worked on the libretto of the Ring it is highly significant that the focus 
moves from the hero Siegfried to the chief god Wotan, especially his downfall. This may give 
some justification for ‘atheist’ productions of the Ring (e.g. that of Keith Warner at Covent 
Garden). But I think Wagner is pointing to something much more profound. In her 
Schlussgesang, Brünnhilde lulls Wotan to sleep in both the words63 and the ‘lullaby’ music, a 
three bar segment of the Valhalla theme which is similar to what we hear when Wotan puts 
Brünnhilde to sleep at the end of Walküre.64 Just as this ‘lullaby’ was a prelude to the flames 
of Loge which were to dance around her rock, so here Wotan is lulled to sleep but in 
preparation for his destruction in the final conflagration which spreads to Valhalla. Now if 
                                                          
60 Selected Letters of Richard Wagner, tr. and ed. Stewart Spencer and Barry Millington (London, 1987), 301; 
SB, vi.60. However, note that Hegel’s has ‘an all-embracing theory of freedom’ (Houlgate, Hegel, 181), aspects 
of which Wagner would not embrace (e.g. regarding the state, economic and family life). 
61 It is true that Plutarch Moralia 419C writes that ‘Great Pan is dead’ but this refers to the end of Greeks gods 
(Pan = ‘all’) and the rise of Christianity (Madeleine Jost ‘Pan’, in Oxford Classical Dictionary, ed. Simon 
Hornblower and Antony Spawforth, 3rd edn (Oxford, 1996), 1103). 
62 The Prose Edda: Norse Mythology, tr. Jesse Byock (London, 2005), 73: ‘The wolf will swallow Odin, and 
that will be his death’. See also Voluspa 62: ‘All unsown the fields will grow, / all harm will be healed, Baldr 
will come; Höd and Baldr will inhabit Hropt’s [i.e. Odin’s] victory-halls, sanctuaries of the slain-gods: do you 
know yet, or what?’ (The Elder Edda, tr. Andy Orchard (London, 2011), 14). 
63 Ring Companion, 349: ‘Rest now, rest now, you god!’ (‘Ruhe! Ruhe, du Gott!’). 
64 Compare Walküre Act III (bars 1625-27) and Götterdämmerung Act III (bars 1357-60). 
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the god who dies is Wotan then we have something fairly straightforward: the chief god 
together with his pantheon die and everything is now in the hands of humanity. However, as 
is often the case with Wagner, he can turn things on their head. For the key god who dies is 
not Wotan, who, as we see in Brünnhilde’s final speech, is guilty! Rather the god who dies is 
Brünnhilde herself.  
She is the daughter of two gods, Wotan and Erda, and if ‘God is love’ (1 John 4:8), 
something fundamental for Feuerbach (and for Wagner), then surely she is the true divine 
figure, not Wotan. At the end of Walküre she undergoes what can be legitimately called an 
incarnation. However, in distinction to the incarnation as represented in New Testament texts 
and in Hegel, she, according to Wotan, actually loses her divinity: ‘so he kisses your godhead 
away’.65 We have an emptying of her divinity, a ‘kenosis’.66 However, when she appears in 
the final scene of Götterdämmerung there are signs that she is transfigured and is in the 
process of regaining her divinity. The stage direction indicates that she enters ‘firmly and 
solemnly (feierlich)’.67 A little later ‘[h]er features grow increasingly transfigured’.68 So one 
gets the impression that Brünnhilde returns to her original godlike existence.69 That she 
seems to recover her divinity in this final scene is highly significant theologically, for it 
means that the one who dies is not simply a human being but a divine figure. When she offers 
herself as a sacrifice at the end of Götterdämmerung, working ‘the deed that redeems the 
world’ (Siegfried Act III Scene 1), the entire cosmos is renewed. Because of Wagner’s views 
on gender, redemption is achieved by the double sacrifice of Siegfried and Brünnhilde70 and 
this is expressed musically right at the end as the Siegfried musical theme is followed by 
Brunnhilde’s. 
                                                          
65 Ring Companion, 191. 
66 This corresponds to Hegel’s understanding of the incarnation. Miller, Phenomenology, 475, does not seem to 
translate Phänomenologie des Geistes ed. Wolfgang Bonsiepen and Reinhard Heede (Hamburg, 1999), 418, 
correctly. Contrast the translation of J.B. Baillie, The Phenomenology of Mind, 2nd edn (London, 1949), 780: 
‘the Divine Being is reconciled with its existence through an event,–the event of God’s emptying Himself of His 
Divine Being through His factual Incarnation and His Death’. 
67 Ring Companion, 347. 
68 Ring Companion, 348. 
69 Cf. Ulrike Kienzle, in Udo Bermbach (ed.), Alles ist nach seiner Art (Stuttgart/Weimar, 2001), 101: ‘Im 
letzten Teil ihres Gesangs kehrt Brünnhilde selbst zu ihrer ursprünglichen Existenz zurück’. 
70 Letter to Rockel, 25/26 January 1854. See SL 307: ‘Not even Siegfried alone (man alone) is the complete 
‘human being’: he is merely the half, only with Brünnhilde does he become the redeemer; one man alone cannot 
do everything; many are needed, and a suffering, self-immolating woman finally becomes the true, conscious 
redeemer: for it is love which is really “the eternal feminine” itself’ (SB, vi.68). 
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As Wagner started work on the Ring he also wrote sketches for an opera Jesus of 
Nazareth. In preparation for this he read systematically through the New Testament in 
Luther’s translation. The prose sketches together with his theological commentary is fairly 
substantial, running to 55 pages in the English translation, but there is just one extant short 
musical sketch of 11 bars. Many of the ideas from the prose sketches end up on the stage of 
the Ring cycle. In particular the death of Brünnhilde in Götterdämmerung resembles that of 
Christ in the Jesus of Nazareth sketches. After Jesus’ death (which occurs off-stage), we read 
‘John and the two Marys return from the crucifixion: “He hath fulfilled.” – Peter feels himself 
inspired with the Holy Spirit: in high enthusiasm he proclaims the fulfilment of Jesus’ 
promise: his words give strength and inspiration to all; he addresses the people, – whoever 
hears him, presses forward to demand baptism (reception into the community). The end’.71 
The key element is that Jesus dies and then the Holy Spirit comes upon Peter and the 
Christian community. Such a telescoping of Good Friday and Pentecost is found in John’s 
gospel (see John 7.39; 19.30)72 and it may well be that Hegel can throw some light on this. In 
Philosophy of History, a work Wagner was reading at around the same time as composing the 
Jesus of Nazareth sketches, Hegel writes: ‘It has been already remarked that only after the 
death of Christ could the Spirit come upon his friends; that only then were they able to 
conceive the true idea of God (die wahrhafte Idee Gottes), viz., that in Christ man is 
redeemed and reconciled’.73 Hegel would know of Luther’s view that in order to atone for 
sins God must die74 and this was in fact central to Hegel’s understanding of the ‘Death of 
God’. He refers to the second stanza of the passion hymn of Johann Rist ‘O Traurigkeit, O 
Herzeleid’ (1641): 
O grosse Not! 
Gott selbst liegt tot. 
Am Kreuz ist er gestorben; 
                                                          
71 PW 8:297; Richard Wagner: Sämtliche Werke, Band 31: Dokumente und Texte zu unvollendeten 
Bühnenwerken, ed. Isolde Vetter and Egon Voss (Mainz, 2005), 246. 
72 See Raymond E. Brown, The Gospel according to John 2 vols. (London, 1978), i.324; ii.931. 
73 History, 340; Geschichte, 396-97. 
74 Eberhard Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World: On the Foundation of the Theology of the Crucified One in 
the Dispute between Theism and Atheism, tr. Darrell L. Guder (Edinburgh, 1983), 95-96, refers to ‘Formula of 
Concord’ (Die Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche, 10th edn (Göttingen, 1986), 1030-31) 
[BSELK] and a work by Karl Christian Flatt who had been Hegel’s fellow student in Tübingen. Both works 
quote Luther’s treatise On Councils and Churches which includes the phrase ‘if it cannot be said that God died 
for us, but only a man, we are lost’ (Luther’s Works, Volume 41 ed. Eric W. Gritsch (Philadelphia, 196), 103). 
Note, however, that not all Lutheran confessions held to the view that God suffered or died (e.g. BSELK 807). 
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hat dadurch das Himmelreich 
uns aus Lieb’ erworben. 
O Great woe! 
God himself lies dead. 
On the cross he has died; 
And thus he has gained for us 
By love the kingdom of heaven. 
This is quoted in Hegel’s first discussion of the death of God75 after which he argues: ‘Good 
Friday must be speculatively re-established in the whole truth and harshness of its God-
forsakenness’.76 Hegel’s point seems to be that up until his own time the death of God in 
Protestant religion and earlier philosophy had ‘only the rank of subjective grief, but not the 
harsh dignity of a grief of God. That God himself is dead was a feeling of subjectivity, but 
not a factor (Moment) of truth in God himself’.77 Hegel wishes to go beyond this and argues 
‘the pure concept or infinity as the abyss of nothingness in which all being is engulfed, must 
signify the infinite grief . . . purely as a moment (factor, impulse) of the supreme Idea, and no 
more than a moment’.78 Further, as Jüngel puts it, ‘The idea of absolute freedom and absolute 
passion are linked together here because God gives himself up to destruction, and thus 
chooses suffering in absolute freedom’.79 As we saw earlier Brünnhilde gives herself up to 
destruction in the flames and does so in ‘absolute freedom’. In fact one of the striking aspects 
of the close of Götterdämmerung is that, as noted above, in Brünnhilde reason and desire 
coincide. For Hegel such a correspondence was exactly what freedom meant.  
Christ’s death is fundamental for Hegel although his interest is more in what he calls 
the speculative Good Friday rather than the Good Friday of the gospels. Resurrection is seen 
in terms of the Spirit at work in the Christian community and the close of Wagner’s Jesus of 
Nazareth corresponds to this. But for Hegel the death of God on Good Friday concerned not 
just this historical death but that ‘the abstraction of the divine essence’ is changed. He writes 
in the Phenomenology: ‘The death of the Mediator is the death not only of his natural aspect 
or of his particular being-for-self, not only of the already dead husk stripped of its essential 
                                                          
75 G.W.F. Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, tr. Walter Cerf and H.S. Harris (Albany, 1977), 190; Jenaer kritische 
Schriften, ed Hartmut Buchner and Otto Poeggeler (Hamburg, 1999), 414. 
76 Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, 191; Schriften, 414. 
77 Jüngel, Mystery, 74-75 (translation modified). 
78 Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, 190; Schriften, 413-14. 
79 Jüngel, Mystery, 74. 
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Being, but also of the abstraction of the divine Being. . .  The death of this picture-thought 
(Vorstellung) contains, therefore, at the same time the death of the abstraction of the divine 
Being which is not posited as Self. That death is the painful feeling of the Unhappy 
Consciousness that God himself is dead’.80 So ‘death becomes transfigured from its 
immediate meaning, viz. the non-being of this particular individual, into the universality of 
the Spirit who dwells in His community, dies in it every day, and is daily resurrected’.81   
Hence with Brünnhilde’s death, the world is ‘reconciled’82 and one can say the Spirit 
of Brünnhilde runs through the re-created world, expressed musically by ‘the glorification of 
Brünnhilde’. The final lines of the Phenomenology, which must be ‘one of the most famous 
endings in the philosophical literature’,83 could also be said to apply to Brünnhilde. Hegel 
speaks of the ‘Spirit emptied out into Time’ (‘der an die Zeit entäusserte Geist’)84 and 
‘Absolute Knowing, or Spirit that knows itself as Spirit’ and the ‘recollection of the Spirits’. 
Hegel concludes: ‘[The Spirits’] preservation, regarded from the side of their free existence 
appearing in the form of contingency, is History; but regarded from the side of their 
[philosophically] comprehended organisation, it is the Science of Knowing in the sphere of 
appearance: the two together, comprehended History, form alike the inwardizing and the 
Golgotha of absolute Spirit, the actuality, truth, and certainty of his throne, without which he 
would be lifeless and alone. Only “from the chalice of this real of spirits / foams forth for 
Him his own infinitude”’.85 The final scene of Götterdämmerung suggests that Brünnhilde is 
not only ‘love personified’ but also the absolute Spirit personified;86 she comes to a position 
of ‘Absolute Knowing’ and through her there is the ‘inwardizing’ (‘Erinnerung’) of the 
absolute Spirit and she represents the ‘Golgotha’ of the absolute Spirit as she empties 
(entäussert) her spirit into the new created order (‘der an die Zeit entäusserte Geist’). As in 
Christian theology the crucified Christ’s spirit fills the universe, so in the Ring it is 
Brünnhilde’s which flows through the whole re-created order. 
 
                                                          
80 Miller, Phenomenology, 476; Phänomenologie, 419. Note again the quotation of Rist’s hymn. 
81 Miller, Phenomenology, 475; Phänomenologie, 418. 
82 Note that Hegel’s preferred term is ‘reconciliation’ rather than ‘redemption’. 
83 Ernst Bloch, Subjekt-Objekt: Erläuterungen zu Hegel (Frankfurt am M., 1962), 100. 
84 Miller, Phenomenology, 492; Phänomenologie, 433. 
85 Miller, Phenomenology, 493; Phänomenologie, 433-34. I have replaces Miller’s ‘Calvary’ with ‘Golgotha’ 
(Schädelstätte). At the end Hegel quotes freely from Schiller’s poem, Die Freundschaft. 
86 Cf. Sandra Corse, Wagner and the New Consciousness (London/Toronto, 1990), 21, who suggests that in the 
Ring ‘history is seen as a dialectic of progress, not of Hegelian spirit, but of Wagnerian love’. 
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